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Kant said that we were never be able to know about the true nature
of matter. The things in themselves would remain unknown to us. There
is a similar problem in quantum mechanics. You cannot provide directly
any property to a physical state represented by a ray in a Hilbert space.
The general theory of relativity teaches time and space were not how they
appear to us, but claims to know that in fact space and time would belong
to a curved space-time. It turned out in the last decades that it is extraor-
dinary difficulty to combine both theories. Based on quantum mechanics I
argue in this paper that the things in themselves remain unknown. There
is probably no substance which we can call spacetime.
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1 Things in Themselves
The term “things in themselves” has become a technical term of Kantian philosophy
although Kant himself did not use the German term “Dinge an sich” consequently.
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Instead of “Ding an sich” he used more often “Ding an sich selbst”, “Gegenstand an
sich selbst ”or “Objekt an sich selbst”1. I believe what he simply meant with those
expressions is that there is a difference between how a thing or an object appears to
us and how the thing or object really - in itself - is. At least this is the way I will use
these terms afterwards. But it is certainly necessary to be more precise. Kant did use
and define two technical terms which cover these issues: phenomena and noumena.
At the same time, if we entitle certain objects, as appearances, sensible
entities (phenomena), then since we distinguish the mode in which we
intuit them from the nature that belongs to them in themselves [...], in
opposition to the former, and that in doing so we entitle them intelligible
entities (noumena).2
Kant gave a destinction between noumena in a negative sense and noumena in a
positive sense which is important for the following.
If by ’noumenon’ we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensible
intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon
in the negative sense of the term. But if we understand by it an object of a
non-sensible intuition, we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition,
namely the intellectual, which is not what we possess, and of which we
cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be ’noumenon’ in the
positive sense of the term.3
I believe that Phyrrhonian skepticism conclusivly proved that we cannot be in pos-
session of knowledge of things in themselves, neither based on emirism, nor based on
rational grounds. Of course modern physics is a challenge to this philosophical point
of view. To Kant physics had to be purely phenomenological, although he was aware
that this phenomenological treatment does not describe matter in the way it is in it-
self. He used the term matter as a noumenon in the negative sense, not believing that
someday anything positive could be said about them. In this article I will examine
if physics can provide us with knowledge about matter in this positive sense. I will
start with phenomenological non-equilibruum thermodynamics and from there I will
go on to the general theory of relativity and at last I will have a brief look at quantum
mechanics.
2 Phenomenological Non-Equilibruum Thermodynamics
In phenomenological non-equilibruum thermodynamics a body or a system B ⊂M is a
connected and compact subset of elements X . These elements X are called the particles
of B and in general there will be an inifinite number of them. The state of a body or
a system is given by the values of a complete set of independent quantities. A state is
1A list of all citations containing those or similar terms can be found in Prauss, G., Kant und das
Problem der Dinge an sich, [Pra89, 13].
2Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, [Kan39, B 306]
3ibid., [Kan39, B 307]
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a point of the statespace which is spanned by a set of independent quantities. There
are two kinds of quantities in thermodynamics: intensive quantities and extensive
quantities. Intensive quantities are temperature T , pressure p, density ρ and so on.
Extensive quantities are for example volume V , mass M , energy E or entropy S. This
destinction goes back to Kant who said in his axioms of intuition that “All intuitions are
extensive magnitudes”4 and in his anticipations of perception: “In all appearances, the
real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude, that is a degree.”5. It is true
that we do feel temperature but we do not feel entropy and we do feel pressure but we do
not feel a volume. What about mass and density? Kant’s distinction of extensive and
intensive magnitudes is not always easy. The physicists formulated a simpler criterion
to distinct intensive quantities from extensive quantities. If you combine two systems,
extensive quantities will add, intensive quantities won’t. For example: If you pour 1
liter of water with a temperature of 20 into a container which already included 1 liter
of water with a temperature of 20 you will get 2 liters of water but the temperature
will remain 20 and won’t get to 40. Therefore the volume V is an extensive quantity
and the temperature T is an intensive variable. In mathematical terms all quantities of
phenomenological nonequilibruum thermodynamics can be given as exterior differential
forms. An exterior differential form of degree p is a totally antisymmetric covariant p-
tensor field overM. A 0-form f is a simple function f :M→ R and might correspond
to an intensive quantity. Forms ω get their physical meaning from the fact that they
can be integrated.
 1-forms θ are integrated over paths γ : R→M,
 2-forms ω are integrated over surfaces S : R2 →M,
 and 3-forms ρ are integrated over volumes V : R3 →M.
Their addity which justifies the name extensive quantities can be seen as follows. Let
ω be now an abritrary p-form integrable on X. Let X1 and X2 be two complementary
subsets of X and χ1, χ2 be their respective characteristic functions in X; then
6∫
X
ω =
∫
X
(χ1 + χ2)ω =
∫
X
χ1ω +
∫
X
χ2ω =
∫
X
χ1ω +
∫
X
χ1ω =
∫
X1
ω +
∫
X2
ω.
In order to understand the way those intergrals are used in phenomenological thermo-
dynamics it is necessary to study how a body B is given to us in terms of coordinate
systems although the value of those intergrals does not depend on the choice of coor-
dinates. A reference configuration is a mapping7:
γ(0)i : B ⊂M −→ R3
X 7−→ Xi = Xi(X ).
4ibid., [Kan39, B 202]
5ibid., [Kan39, B 207]
6Choquet-Bruhat, Y. and DeWitt-Morette, C. and Dillard-Bleick, M., Analysis, Manifolds and
Physics, [CBDMDB77, p 215]
7The following treatment is based on Greve, R., Kontinuumsmechanik, [Gre03, pp.1].
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This reference configuration describes a special state of the body for example at time
t = 0. The momentary configuration is a mapping:
γ(t)i : B −→ R3
X 7−→ xi = xi(X , t).
The index i stands for the observer I. A motion of B is a mapping χ:
χi : R3 −→ R3
Xi 7−→ xi = xi(Xi, t).
All coordinate representations of extensive or intensive quantities are given either as
material coordinate expression ωα,β(Xi, t) or as spatial material coordinate expressions
ωα,β(xi, t). There are two kinds of time derivations, the material time derivation
ω˙α,β =
dωα,β
dt
=
∂ωα,β(Xi, t)
∂t
or the local or spatial time derivation
∂ωα,β
∂t
=
∂ωα,β(xi, t)
∂t
.
The velocity vi is material time derivation of the motion χi
vi =
dxi
dt
=
∂xi(Xi, t)
∂t
.
A finer point of this construction is that the reference configuration somewhat gives
all particles X a Name Xi, but in fact there is nothing available that can be named
and identified throughout the motion xi(Xi, t). We do not observe particle trajec-
tories and we cannot name particles. We identify physical bodies as appearances in
our mind and not as bodies summed up out of elementary particles. Therefore our
physical phenomenological knowledge is not objective knowledge of the matter itself.
It is subjective knowledge of appearances and the point is that this knowledge is in-
tersubjectively valid. Different observers I and K will give different reference and
momentary configurations. But they will be linked by transition functions gik.
Xi = gik(0)Xk, xi = gik(t)xk
Therefore one needs to have a fibre bundle structure (M,R, f,G) on the manifold M
with f beeing a global time function
f :M−→ R
which projectsM on the base space R which models the timeline and G is the structure
group with gik ∈ G8. Locally and maybe globally the bundle is a trivial bundle, which
8For a general treatment of fibre bundles see Choquet-Bruhat, Y. and DeWitt-Morette, C. and
Dillard-Bleick, M., Analysis, Manifolds and Physics, [CBDMDB77, pp 125].
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means that there are open intervals Ui on R for which the momentary configuration
maps f−1(Ui) into R3. Therefore M is (locally) the R× R3.
f−1(Ui) −→ R× R3
χ 7−→ (t, γ(t)i(χ))
These requirements are in fact a little stronger than needed, since it is just necessary
to define the momentary configuration γ(t)i on the body B and not on f−1(Ui)9. The
most important equations in nonequilibruum thermodynamics are balance equations
like the conservation of energy or the entropy production. The conservation of energy,
written down in differential forms with energy densitiy e is simply
de = 0
In coordinates of the momentary configuration the energy density e takes the form
e = edx ∧ dy ∧ dz + jxdt ∧ dy ∧ dz − jydt ∧ dx ∧ dz + jzdt ∧ dx ∧ dy and the first law
of thermodynamics becomes
∂e
∂t
+
∂jx
∂x
+
∂jy
∂y
+
∂jz
∂z
= 0
in a similar way, with entropy density s and entropy production σ,
ds = σ
gives the second law of thermodynamics by demanding that σ ≥ 0. The main criticism
coming from the theory of relativity is that this fibre bundle structure on M is some
sort of prejustice towardsM. Physicists hope that by writing down all equations in a
coordinate independent form they can avoid assuming thatM is isomorphic to R×R3.
They say: There is no absolute time and no absolute space.
3 The Geometry of Spacetime
I will skip here the discussion of special relativity and go on directly to the general
theory of relativity. In general relativity the fibre bundle structure ofM is abandoned.
One refers directly to the elements X of M, which are not called particles anymore
but events. A chart (U, φ) on the manifold M is an open set U ⊂M together with a
homomorphism10
φ : U → V
X 7−→ xα
9The intervall Ui must cover the time of the existance of B or at least the time in which B is
physically described.
10Choquet-Bruhat, Y. and DeWitt-Morette, C. and Dillard-Bleick, M., Analysis, Manifolds and
Physics, [CBDMDB77, pp 111]
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of U onto an open subset V in R4. There is no structure group of coordinate transfor-
mations in general relativity and given two charts (Ui, φi) and (Uk, φk) the transitions
functions arise as mappings
gik ≡ φi ◦ φk−1 : φk(Ui ∩ Uk) −→ φi(Ui ∩ Uk)
xk
α 7−→ X 7−→ xiβ
I find it even more implausible to refer to elements X of a spacetime M than to
refer to particles of a body B ⊂ M. The question arises wether physicists
actually know the mappings φi or φk
−1. The first guess would be to assume
that the coordinates arise from measurements. But what is there to measure? You
cannot measure the coordinates of an event X . A coordinate system, like it is given
by the Global Navigation Satelite System (GNSS), is constructed, which means that
the engineers know from a priori what they want to achieve and then they realize it.
They start with atomic clocks, which give the proper time s =
∫
γ
ds of their world line
γ. But in order to spread out this local time throughout an open supset Ui ⊂M one
needs to synchronize several atomic clocks. Einstein made the following proposal to
synchcronize clocks: A lightray should be emitted from clock A at time tA, measured
by clock A, and should be reflected in B at time tB measured by clock B. Finally the
light ray will be absorbed in A at time tA′ , measured by clock A. The two clocks A
and B are considered to be synchronous if the following equation holds:
tB − tA = tA′ − tB
This definition is not sufficient for the GNSS, because there one has to match the speed
the clocks operate. All kinds of ’relativistic effects’ have to be taken into account before
one is able to endorse a perfectly prerelativistic coordinate system. The GNSS does
not give the ’real’ coordinates of a local subset Ui ⊂ M of the spacetime, it gives a
coordinate system, which is chosen to be easy to operate without any knowledge of
the theory of relativity and this coordinate system is therefore in agreement with time
and space as ”forms of our intuition“. In order to give the user the desired coordinate
system the engineers break what is considered to be a law of nature by some physicists.
They do not obey what Einstein said about the synchronisation of clocks. He said all
clocks must be built in the same way and therefore operate at the same rate. But if the
engineers had done so, the positions the GNSS gives would have been inaccurate. The
deeper reason is that in the GNSS there is an absolute time in the sense that all clocks
show the same time coordinate t independently from their actual proper time s =
∫
γ
ds
and this is what enables the notion of a position in space defined by t = const. Let
us now leave the coordinate systems and the GNSS aside: Writing down all laws of
physics in a coordinate independent way might free us from the prejudice coming from
the a priori use of prerelativistic coordinate systems. Given a curve γ : t 7→ γ(t), the
velocity is the tangent vector
va =
d
dt
γ(t).
This velocity is contrary to the usual three-dimensional velocity four-dimensional and
is not defined relative to some body of reference but in an absolute way against the
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spacetime M. The acceleration is defined as
ab = va∇avb.
The derivative operator ∇a is chosen to conserve the metric gbc:
∇agbc = 0
There are three different phenomena wich are included in the definition of an acceler-
ation. The body might simply speed up or slow down. In this case the acceleration
points into the same direction as the velocity.
va∇avb = αvb
Generally the body will change its direction througout his motion. This effect, when
va∇avb 6= αvb, is called acceleration as well, even if the body does not seem to speed
up or slow down. It is mathematically often convenient to choose the time parameter
t of the curve γ in a way that the effect of speeding up and slowing down are removed
from the equation va∇avb = αvb which becomes va∇avb = 0. These definitions give
an astonishing picture. The movement of free falling objects including the planets
and the stars is in fact unaccelerated. But the ”solid” ground on earth is accelerated!
What most physicists actually say about this is something entirely different. They
take the equation for an unaccelerated geodesic motion va∇avb = 0 and split up the
derivative operator ∇a
va∇avb = va∂avb + Γbacvavc = 0
and then they write the equation above as follows
va∂av
b = −Γbacvavc.
All of a sudden va∂av
b describes the accelaration and the terms −Γbacvavc are in-
terpreted as gravitational and inertial forces. But va∂av
b is only in flat spacetime
the acceleration of a moving object. va∂av
b equals zero for the “solid” ground and
therefore
va∇avb = va∂avb + Γbacvavc = Γbacvavc 6= 0.
According to the genral theory of relativity the surface of our earth is accelerated.
But when it comes to applications the physicists return to space and time as they
are in phenomenological physics despite all that theory demands. The general theory
of relativity describes a world which is fundamentally different from the world we
percieve. Even in the limit of small masses and small velocities the general theory of
relativity does not describe the world as we know it.
4 Quantum Mechanics
Apart from Pyrrhonian skepticism I have no general objections against the attempt
to get rid of the a priori prejudice of Euclidean geometry with the help of differential
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geometry. But there are deep problems in combining this approach with quantum
mechanics. In quantum mechanics physical states are represented by rays R in Hilbert
spaceH and with ’physical state’ I believe this time the things in themselves are meant.
It has always been a puzzling aspect of Kantian philosophy that physics should be
based on the analogies of experience like the law of causation, which are only valid
for appearances - representations of our mind - while the matter, which in fact causes
our experiences, is nevertheless not accessible to us. A similar problem - I believe
that it is in fact the same problem - exists in quantum mechanics. Just like Kant’s
transcendental object x we cannot address any physical properties to rays in Hilbert
space, which shall nevertheless represent the physical state. Kant explains why it is
like this:
We have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible
representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as
objects capable of existing outside our power of representation. When,
then, is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and
consequently also distinct from, our knowledge? It is easily seen that this
object must be thought only as something in general = x, since outside our
knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge
as corresponding to it.11
Physical observables are represented by Hermitian operators A on that Hilbert space
H. In quantum mechanics our physical knowledge, most importantly the form of the
Hamilton operator, is taken from classical mechanics, from a phenomenological point of
view. The physical state itself does not possess the properties of classical mechanics.
It remains general. If a vector Ψ representing a ray R were an eigenvector of that
operator A
AΨn = αΨn
then we could somehow say that this physical state Ψn possesses the property A with
the amount of α. But in general vectors are superpositions Ψ of these eigenvectors
Ψn and all we can do is to measure the property A where we will find the quantity
α with propability | (Ψ,Ψn) |. Some physicists say that during this measurement the
state Ψ collapses to the state Ψn so that the physical state afterwards really possesses
the measured property A with the amount α at least for a while. I feel that this
assumption is unneccessary and causes more problems than it solves. Let us have
a closer look at the measurement of a position x of a single particle state without
leaving the minimal interpretation of quantum mechanics given above. X shall be the
operator that represents the position x of that particle. Let Ψ5 be the eigenvector of
X to the eigenvalue 5.
XΨ5 = 5Ψ5
A physical state can be a superposition of some of these eigenvectors, for example
Ψ = a(5)Ψ5 + a(7)Ψ7, but in general it might be a superposition Ψ =
∫
Ψi(xi)Ψxidxi
of all these infinitely many eigenvectors Ψxi . Ψi(x) is called the wavefunction of that
11Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, [Kan39, A 104]
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particle and it contains the same information as Ψ. One often says that Ψi(x) is the
representation of Ψ in coordinate space. And although we have mappings Ψi : xi 7→
Ψi(x), there are no mappings Φi : xi 7→ Ψ and no mappings Φ−1k : Ψ 7→ xk and
consequently we do not know the transition functions gik : Φi ◦ Φ−1k . The
coordinates do not arise from the things in themselves. Space and time remain forms
of our intuition.
5 Comments
It is said that Einstein outgrew the limits of our understanding concerning space and
time. The question arises with what kind of expertise I put that in question. I have to
admit: With no other expertise than what you can read from what I wrote above. I did
not become a physicist because I felt that I would have to follow too many main lines
that I do not believe in. Tony Rothman describes in “The Man Behind the Curtain”12
what detered me from becoming a physicist:
“I want to get down to the basics. I want to learn the fundamentals. I want
to understand the laws that govern the behavior of the universe.“ Thou-
sands of admissions officers and physics department chairs have smiled over
such words set down by aspiring physicists in their college-application es-
says, and that is hardly surprising, for every future physicist writes that
essay, articulating the sentiments of all of us who choose physics as a career:
to touch the fundamentals, to learn how the universe operates. It is also the
view the field holds of itself and the way physics is taught: Physics is the
most fundamental of the natural sciences; it explains Nature at its deepest
level; the edifice it strives to construct is all-encompassing, free of internal
contradictions, conceptually compelling and—above all—beautiful. The
range of phenomena physics has explained is more than impressive; it un-
derlies the whole of modern civilization. Nevertheless, as a physicist trav-
els along his (in this case) career, the hairline cracks in the edifice become
more apparent, as does the dirt swept under the rug, the fudges and the
wholesale swindles, with the disconcerting result that the totality occasion-
ally appears more like Bruegel’s Tower of Babel as dreamt by a modern
slumlord, a ramshackle structure of compartmentalized models soldered
together into a skewed heap of explanations as the whole jury-rigged mon-
strosity tumbles skyward. [ ... ] But even at the undergraduate level, far
back from the front lines, deep holes exist; yet the subject is presented as
one of completeness while the holes—let us say abysses—are planked over
in order to camouflage the danger. It seems to me that such an approach
is both intellectually dishonest and fails to stimulate the habits of inquiry
and skepticism that science is meant to engender.
I understand and accept that ”Reality is not what it seems.“ as Carlo Rovelli puts
12Rothman, T., The Man Behind the Curtain, [Rot11]
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it.13 But I prefer explanations that lie within the limits of my understanding. A
sentence like ’Photons are particles and waves at the same time.’ does not teach me
anything. When I am told that Gallilean coordinate transformations are wrong and
Lorentz transformations are correct, but afterwards in general relativity it does not
matter which coordinate system is used at all, I do not understand why I had to
give up the Gallilean transformations, which look totally sensible, in the first place.
Poincare´ said that the choice of coordinate transformations is a matter of convention
and this convention defines what is to be understood by an ideal rigid rod and what
kind of geometry should be valid.14 Einstein thought he could define time and space
by measurements of real clocks and real rigid rods and make geometry in this way a
part of physics15. Poincare´ saw this idea before him and rejected it for good reason.
Einstein was aware of that.
Why is the obvious equivalence of the practically-rigid body of experience
and the body of geometry rejected by Poincare´ and other researchers?
Simply because on closer inspection the solid bodies are not rigid, because
their geometric behaviour, i.e. their relative storage facilities, depend on
temperature, external forces, etc.. ... Sub specie aeterni Poincare´ was
right with this view. There is no object in the real world that exactly
corresponds to the concept of a measuring rod and to the concept of a
measuring clock. It is also clear that the solid body and the clock do not
play the part of irreducible elements in the concept of fundamental physics,
but the role of compound structures that may play no independent role
in building physics. Though, it is my belief that these terms at today’s
stage of development of theoretical physics must be used as independent
items because we are still too far away from such a secure knowledge of
the theoretical foundations of atomism to be able to give exact theoretical
constructions of these structures.16
Einstein used the example of a two dimensional coordinate system of small measuring
rods on a table. If you put in the middle of the table some heat on, the measuring
rods will lengthen a bit and the coordinate system will get into disorder. Einstein
said that one is able to consider this as an example of a curved space.17. That is an
unorthodox way of looking at things. The physicists have to rely on measurements.
But if these measurements do not show the expected Euclidean behaviour, there might
be an explanation why they don’t, apart from saying that they measure out a curved
spacetime. The measurement of distances is based on the measurement of time and
the propagation of light. The Maxwell equations are simply dF = 0 and dH = j with
the material conditions H = ∗F . No difference between Gallilean or Lorentz trans-
formation can be read from these equations and one cannot see why these equations
should be able to describe the influence of gravitation but no ordinary refraction of
13Rovelli, C., Reality Is Not What It Seems, [Rov16]
14Poincare´, H.,Science and Hypotheseis, [Poi05]
15Einstein, A., U¨ber die spezielle und allgemeine Relativita¨tstheorie, [Ein13, pp 2]
16Einstein, A., Mein Weltbild, [Ein80, pp.122], translation M.W
17Einstein, A., U¨ber die spezielle und allgemeine Relativita¨tstheorie, [Ein13, pp 56]
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light. If one puts a stick into water and it looks bended, does that mean that spacetime
is curved? If it looked bended due to gravitation affecting the propagation of light,
physicists would say that the bending comes from curved spacetime. Why do physi-
cists make a difference here? Einstein said he made a difference between gravitation
and other influences, because gravitation affects every body in exactly the same way
and there would be no way of defining a distance without ’stark arbitrariness’ (krasse
Willku¨r)18. But I think that geometry is in fact conventional as Poincare´ said.
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